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Introduction 6 
National and global regulatory measures are required to control the effects of 7 
anthropogenic climate change. In contrast to measures that incentivize lower emissions, 8 
as well as substitute fossil fuels for alternative energy sources, geoengineering involves 9 
interventions downstream from business-as-usual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 10 
One set of strategies—Solar Radiation Management (SRM)—manipulate other factors 11 
determining the Earth’s temperature. Another set—Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), or 12 
more recently Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs)—extract carbon from the 13 
atmosphere itself. This can be achieved by using synthetic mechanisms to capture and 14 
store carbon, or by enhancing or accelerating natural mechanisms that already do this. 15 
The latter of these includes enhanced weathering—our focus—as well as afforestation 16 
and other techniques.  17 
 18 
In deciding which options to encourage and enact, policy-makers face not only 19 
questions about efficiency and engineering, but also ethics. We provide an overview of 20 
the ethical issues arising from NETs, particularly enhanced weathering, aiming to focus 21 
on issues not already covered in detail elsewhere1,2. Although the ethical considerations 22 
are quite general, they interact with different techniques and strategies in different ways. 23 
Furthermore, different ethical considerations are potentially in tension. Some ethical 24 
issues turn in part on uncertainty about the effectiveness and consequences of enhanced 25 
weathering, and so motivate further research; while others offer the opposite council, as 26 
the development of enhanced weathering techniques might itself come at an ethical cost. 27 
 28 
Silicate weathering—the process whereby silicate transforms into carbonate—affects 29 
the global carbon cycle; as does the breakdown of carbon by aquatic biological agents, 30 
and the transferal of terrestrial CO2 into the oceans. Thus, the global carbon cycle’s 31 
efficiency depends in part on terrestrial and aquatic biochemical composition. Although 32 
on short time scales natural weathering processes are comparatively weak3, such 33 
processes could be radically amplified, turning the Earth into a more efficient carbon 34 
processor4. The basic biochemical processes involved are well understood5, and can be 35 
studied at a local level6. Indeed, the basic notions are quite simple: given that global 36 
carbon processing is in part driven by how much silicate is exposed to weathering, 37 
increasing its exposure by dusting large amounts of the Earth’s surface with finely 38 
ground, highly reactive, silicates would increase that processing, particularly if coupled 39 
with biotic aids (such as certain plant varieties). The specifics are varied, from large-40 
scale terrestrial dusting7,8, to incorporating industrial by-products9, to increasing oceanic 1 
olivine10. Enhanced weathering techniques are sometimes considered to be a less 2 
extreme option than SRM, and perhaps implementable at a relatively local level (we 3 
shall emphasize this point below). Further, given that agricultural practices already alter 4 
large sections of the Earth’s surface in analogous ways (mineral fertilization to increase 5 
soil alkalinity, soil tilling and liming, etc.), there is potential for enhanced weathering to 6 
piggyback on existing practices. Finally, increases in oceanic alkalinity would 7 
potentially come with the co-benefit of alleviating acidification and increasing biomass. 8 
 9 
However, uncertainty about the global-scale efficiency and effects of enhanced 10 
weathering is high. The reasons should be familiar: global systems are complex, 11 
interconnected, and thus difficult to model. Even in comparison with SRMs, enhanced 12 
weathering is understudied at global scales, and models are not well resolved10. Some 13 
mineral outputs of enhanced weathering are potentially toxic at high concentrations. 14 
Organic and inorganic CO2 dynamics are coupled in complex ways
11, and it is unclear 15 
how manipulating mineralogical composition will affect biological CO2 absorption, and 16 
vice-versa. The practical costs of locating (or generating), processing, and transporting 17 
the large volumes of minerals required for large-scale enhanced weathering (to say 18 
nothing of the production costs of biotic materials) are likely to be immense. The 19 
possible side effects, both apparently beneficial and problematic, are voluminous10. For 20 
more on the specifics of enhanced weathering, see the other papers in this collection. 21 
 22 
In addition to these practical, theoretical, and empirical challenges, weighing the 23 
advisability of enhanced weathering against other candidate strategies has ethical 24 
dimensions. We highlight these, with a specific focus on the role of states, both because 25 
this simplifies an already complex discussion, and because states are plausibly in a 26 
position to both regulate and initiate strategies for mitigating and reducing climate 27 
change, as well as entering into the kinds of international agreements required. Where 28 
other reviews of the ethics have been general across geoengineering1,2, we will focus on 29 
the relationship between relatively general ethical considerations and the specific case 30 
of enhanced weathering. 31 
 32 
 i. Post-implementation scenarios 33 
Pak-Hang Wong12 argues that the ethical debate over geoengineering misses important 34 
ethical issues arising post-implementation. These include the responsibility for 35 
continuation and monitoring, which he refers to together as 'the requirement of 36 
maintenance'12. Indeed, some enhanced weathering techniques require significant 37 
infrastructure. And the best locations for implementation in terms of climate and 38 
mineralogy lack existing agricultural systems to co-opt10. Further, ongoing monitoring 39 
of the effects would be costly.  40 
 1 
Who is responsible for maintenance? How should the burden of maintenance be shared? 2 
There is no easy answer to such questions: we might think that the party who 3 
implements the geoengineering technology is responsible for maintenance into the 4 
indefinite future; but equally might think that they have done more than their fair share 5 
by absorbing the costs of implementation, and thus maintenance should fall to others.  6 
 7 
Many authors note the risks of any abrupt halt to certain geoengineering interventions 8 
(although they usually have SRM rather than CDR in mind13,14,12,15), a risk that becomes 9 
more likely to materialize if responsibility for maintenance, once geoengineering 10 
techniques have been implemented, is spread between groups. Wong argues that any 11 
ethics of geoengineering must take a long-term perspective12. Given that, generally 12 
speaking, geoengineering measures are often presented as impermanent, stop-gap 13 
measures, maintenance and removal costs must be considered alongside 14 
implementation. It is not obvious, for instance, how long the effects of enhanced 15 
weathering might last. If a decade has been spent adding vast quantities of silicate rock 16 
to previously mineral-poor areas, what downstream effects would occur were we to turn 17 
off the tap? In this regard SRM is likely more problematic than CDR, but the more 18 
dramatic vis-à-vis scale and impact CDR interventions are, the less likely we are to be 19 
able to predict and understand the implications of cessation. Post-implementation 20 
scenarios, then, raise both ethical and empirical puzzles that remain unresolved. 21 
 22 
ii. Failures of collective action 23 
It is often thought that a Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) between states is a major 24 
block to national and global action on GHGs. That is, the interests of each state 25 
(business-as-usual or increasing emissions) come apart from what is in the interest of 26 
states taken together (mutual restrictions to emissions). It is plausible that achieving 27 
mutual restrictions, whatever the exact target, would not require equal action from all 28 
states. Indeed, some states could take no action at all. This creates an incentive to be an 29 
inactive state. If this is right, then there may be conditions under which a state could 30 
take no action, while avoiding ethical culpability. Alternatively, states may be 31 
culpable—e.g. for colluding in their collective failure to agree16. That a state may lack 32 
culpability despite failing to do what is in the combined interests of states, applies to 33 
enhanced weathering in two ways: firstly, to the decision to implement enhanced 34 
weathering instead of reducing GHG emissions in a more straightforward way; 35 
secondly, to the implementation and maintenance of enhanced weathering, as discussed 36 
above.  37 
 38 
Imagine that in the future, states are forced to implement NETs because of a prior 39 
collective failure to negotiate the international agreement that would have solved the 40 
TOC and allowed them to mitigate climate change without the use of NETs (or 1 
geoengineering techniques more broadly). Particular states may not be culpable for this 2 
failure, e.g. because taking unilateral action would not have made a significant 3 
difference either to the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere or to the agreement 4 
being negotiated; or because they had reasonable, but ultimately mistaken beliefs about 5 
what other states were willing to do17,18. Other states may be culpable, e.g. because they 6 
caused the failure. 7 
Further, note that because NETs are processes that last through time12 their maintenance 8 
may itself create a TOC. This TOC may be international and hold between countries that 9 
could share the burden of maintaining specific NET interventions; it may be domestic 10 
but intergenerational, holding between successive governments of the same country; or 11 
it may be both international and intergenerational—as in Gardiner’s ‘perfect moral 12 
storm'19. The threat of a TOC for maintenance may be a sufficient reason to refrain from 13 
deploying a specific NET, particularly due to high transition costs or risks from abrupt 14 
cessation of the intervention (insofar as such risks exist). The possibility of a TOC for 15 
maintenance depends in part on the cost of collective action, and thus the specifics of 16 
the different kinds of NETs matter here. If enhanced weathering can be implemented at 17 
relatively low costs it could be part of an overall response to climate change: especially 18 
in partnership with existing agricultural practices (especially when contrasted with 19 
SRM). However, establishing this requires significant research and moreover, as we 20 
explain below, using enhanced weathering to avoid reducing GHG emissions (rather 21 
than in combination with reductions) potentially creates a serious moral hazard. 22 
 23 
But does a TOC in fact hold? Nicholas Stern20 and Fergus Green21 (the latter more 24 
forcibly) argue that radically reducing emissions does not, contrary to received wisdom, 25 
put states into a TOC, because of the nature of the co-benefits that would accrue from 26 
doing do. If states, or at least particular states, could be reducing emissions and 27 
obtaining co-benefits all the while freeing up resources for additional welfare, but are 28 
not doing so, then they wrong their citizens, whose interests they are supposed to serve. 29 
 30 
 iii. Distribution of risk, externalities, and redress for damage 31 
Some NETs might displace risk from those deploying them onto others. This 32 
displacement can be spatial and temporal: onto people in future generations, or people 33 
living in other countries22. This is likely for enhanced weathering: the most effective 34 
areas for deployment are the hot, wet climes of the tropics, so the (often severely 35 
underprivileged) people living there would be exposed to the risk of unintended 36 
consequences, such as toxic by-products from increased silicate weathering. 37 
 38 
Such risks are one kind of 'negative externality'; in general, negative externalities are 39 
costs borne by those other than the technology’s implementers. Externalities may be 40 
positive. Countries in drier, colder climes would likely reap the benefits of lower carbon 1 
levels, less acidic seas, and higher biological production from large-scale enhanced 2 
weathering implemented in tropical zones; ocean-based increases in biomass would 3 
surely not respect national borders, so that were the US (let us imagine) to implement 4 
such measures in their territorial waters, the effects would be felt in Mexico. Risks can 5 
be negative externalities when they cross borders (or generations) in the same way22. 6 
 7 
One ethical question is whether it is permissible to implement techniques that impose 8 
risks on others without their having a say, in particular when they may not even benefit 9 
from the techniques' desired initial effects; another is how such risks should be 10 
distributed among candidate recipients and managed so as to minimize them.  If 11 
enhanced rock weathering were implemented by the UK Government, for example, and 12 
that had consequences that caused serious damage, who would be responsible for 13 
repairing―or compensating for―that damage? Ethical considerations potentially 14 
require those nations that implement the technologies and benefit from them to absorb 15 
(or compensate for) the relevant externalities and materialized risks. (On the ethical 16 
obligations of those countries that benefit from geoengineering, see Heyward23.) 17 
 18 
Issues of post-implementation, collective action, and redress for damage are all 19 
exacerbated by uncertainty. Although reducing or removing uncertainty will not fully 20 
resolve the ethical issues, it would certainly clarify them. As such, these ethical points 21 
encourage further consideration and research into enhanced weathering techniques. 22 
However, other ethical considerations push in the other direction, to which we now turn. 23 
 24 
 iv. 'Dirty Hands' — or, arming the future 25 
Is a government ever permitted to do something unethical because doing so will prevent 26 
even more unethical consequences? In this section, we assume for the sake of argument 27 
that NET measures come at some ethical cost, e.g. by creating moral hazard, by placing 28 
us in a dominating relationship with nature, or by creating opportunity costs—perhaps 29 
implementing NET will mean not doing some other valuable action, like alleviating 30 
poverty. In the case at hand, the question is whether a government would be permitted 31 
to choose enhanced weathering in a straight choice between that and business-as-usual 32 
emissions. Whether having ‘dirty hands’—purposefully performing an unethical action 33 
to avoid some even less ethically desirable outcome—is impermissible is often cashed 34 
out in terms of how 'categorical' we take ethical claims to be24,25. 35 
 36 
From a categorical perspective, choosing dirty hands is impermissible. But those who 37 
take a less categorical view of morality may see it as laudable. It is not easy to do 38 
something others, here both nations and individuals, may consider unethical, but doing 39 
it to secure a better outcome is somewhat heroic. Of course, all of this is mere hypocrisy 40 
if a government claims that the reason for doing something unethical is that otherwise it 1 
will do something even more unethical. Governments have control over what they do, 2 
and in that case the answer is easy: do neither! The harder question involves doing 3 
something unethical to prevent someone else from doing something worse (or 4 
something worse from happening). 5 
 6 
An argument along these lines has been made by Paul Crutzen26, and is criticized by 7 
Stephen Gardiner27. Gardiner refers to it as the 'arm the future' argument. It goes like 8 
this. Reducing emissions would be best. We are not doing much to reduce emissions, 9 
and that will probably continue. At some point, people will be faced with a terrible 10 
choice: geoengineering, or catastrophe. Obviously, geoengineering is better than 11 
catastrophe, so those people should choose it. Without the research, that choice is 12 
unavailable. So, we should do the research27. Gardiner's main objection to this argument 13 
is that current governments still have control over whether it is true that 'we're not doing 14 
much to reduce emissions', and that 'that will probably continue'. It is up to us whether 15 
we take more radical action to reduce emissions in a way that will not force anyone into 16 
the position of having to use geoengineering techniques—whether SRM or 17 
CDR/NETs—to avoid catastrophe. For as long as this remains true (and for as long as 18 
individual countries are not 'off the hook' because of collective action problems), 19 
Gardiner's criticism is persuasive. 20 
 21 
It is worth emphasizing that we need not choose between enhanced weathering and 22 
reduced GHGs: insofar as NETs are relatively cheap, relatively low-impact ways of 23 
mitigating the effects of increased carbon emissions, they may be a natural partner to 24 
more traditional strategies. Relatedly, it is not obvious that there is bright red line, on 25 
one side of which GHG emissions reduction is a plausible strategy, the other side of 26 
which geoengineering is the only way forwards. Plausibly, the situation is more 27 
complicated, and some desirable scenarios combine the two. 28 
 29 
However, insofar as we choose to emphasize NETs at the expense of reducing GHGs 30 
(that is, there are opportunity costs), or insofar as emphasizing such after-the-fact 31 
technological solutions lowers the urgency of reducing GHGs, a choice is being made 32 
about the extent to which ongoing natural systems such as the carbon cycle will depend 33 
on human technology. It strikes us as important that this choice is seen as such. This 34 
naturally leads to considering the possible moral hazards of developing NETs. 35 
 36 
 v. Moral hazard 37 
In the last section we assumed that NETs are ethically costly. In the next three, we 38 
consider reasons why this might be true. 39 
The notion of 'moral hazard' comes from economics, and is the idea that 'people with 40 
insurance may take greater risks than they would do without it because they know they 1 
are protected'28,29,30,31. Applied to NETs, the moral hazard is that because countries have 2 
the 'safeguard' available of removing carbon with NETs (not to mention reducing the 3 
temperature with SRM), they may diminish their efforts to reduce GHG emissions in 4 
other ways. 5 
 6 
Of course, whether geoengineering measures actually pose a moral hazard depends on 7 
whether we should think of them as 'insurance'—back-up plans to be used only in cases 8 
where the primary plan fails—or as legitimate primary plans. To dip briefly into fantasy, 9 
imagine that enhanced weathering techniques had developed to the stage that the 10 
planet’s rate of carbon processing was, in effect, under our immediate and fine-grained 11 
control. Under these conditions, what reasons would we have for lowering our GHG 12 
emissions? Here, enhanced weathering is not merely a stopgap, but an ongoing part of 13 
planet management (although, as we discuss below, the dominating position of humans 14 
in this scenario may yet be problematic). If it is a legitimate primary plan, then there is 15 
no reason to frame the issue as involving moral hazard. There would not be anything 16 
morally hazardous about countries diminishing their efforts to reduce GHG emissions. 17 
 18 
How should we think about the implementation of NETs compared with straightforward 19 
efforts to reduce emissions, e.g. by cutting consumption, switching to clean energy 20 
sources, investing in public transport infrastructure while raising taxes on private 21 
vehicle usage, transforming fossil fuel and agricultural industries into alternative 22 
sustainable industries, and so on? The most persuasive argument for conceiving of 23 
(certain kinds of) SRM and CDR techniques as creating 'moral hazard' involves their 24 
safety. Efforts to reduce emissions in the way just mentioned are generally safe, and 25 
often involve co-benefits. Caution is required here: although there are clear health 26 
benefits in encouraging people in developed countries to drive less, there are economic 27 
costs involved in dramatic changes to consumption and production, which often fall on 28 
the most vulnerable. However, these costs are, in a sense, the kinds of costs we are used 29 
to. In contrast, some SRM and CDR strategies are far from safe (it has even been 30 
suggested that afforestation is problematic32). This worry is less pressing for less 31 
ambitious forms of enhanced weathering. 32 
 33 
The combination of the possibility of moral hazard and uncertainty generates something 34 
of a dilemma. If the Royal Society Report is correct, then more research is required to 35 
decide whether or not various strategies in fact present moral hazards. However, if they 36 
do, then that research should not be done, as often doing the research, and making a 37 
technology available, are coupled29. 38 
 vi. International governance 39 
Enhanced weathering, at the scale required to genuinely make emissions 'negative', will 40 
have to be administered globally and will therefore have global impacts and carry global 1 
risks. For example, enhanced rock weathering requires the dusting of huge tracts of land 2 
with finely ground rock silicate. That land may lie outside the country implementing the 3 
technology, and may have impacts on everyone (via its general effects on the climate 4 
system), and on those in the countries whose land is dusted (e.g. effects on those 5 
populations' respiratory health)—and indeed on those in bordering countries if the rock 6 
silicate crosses borders via wind currents. NETs therefore require appropriate global 7 
governance22,23,29,28. 8 
 9 
One of the five 'Oxford Principles' requires 'public participation in geoengineering 10 
decision-making', another requires 'governance before deployment'33,34,35. The Royal 11 
Society notes: 12 
 13 
'...a flexible framework for international regulation is needed. [...] In general however, any future 14 
improvements to the regulatory context should be democratic, transparent, and flexible [...] and 15 
should discourage unilateral action'28. 16 
 17 
The problem, of course, is that we do not have international democratic institutions in 18 
place: by which we mean, institutions that in some sense give every potentially affected 19 
individual a voice in decision-making. Not all countries are democratic, and even those 20 
that are often fail to consult with their citizens before making important decisions. Even 21 
if we ignore this 'democratic deficit' and focus only on groups of state representatives, 22 
e.g. parties to the UNFCCC, there is still a problem of efficacy. Parties met 20 times 23 
since 1992 and accomplished very little36. The Paris Agreement is something of an 24 
exception; but parties' current pledges are unlikely to sum to the Agreement's stated 25 
goal. How, then, should we think about the prospects of global governance of large-26 
scale NETs into the indefinite future? 27 
 28 
If there is no institution for (genuine) global democracy, then it is hard to see how 29 
global governance of geoengineering could be feasible. If it is not feasible, then the 30 
requirement cannot be met, and at its most dramatic, this means either scrapping the 31 
requirement, or scrapping geoengineering. Of course, which of these we should do 32 
depends on the severity of the risks, which are a lot worse for certain kinds of SRM 33 
approaches than for certain kinds of NETs. Even within NETs, some are riskier than 34 
others: cloud treatment and enhanced weathering involve more risk and uncertainty than 35 
'blue carbon' (that is, capture from oceanic and coastal ecosystems) habitat restoration. 36 
The greater the uncertainty and the worse the risks, the less acceptable it is to make 37 
global interventions without appropriate global governance. For NETs with lower risks, 38 
and about which there is less uncertainty, governance by the UNFCCC may represent 39 
the best compromise between political feasibility and moral desirability. 40 
 41 
 vii. The 'hubris' objection 1 
The hubris objection to the implementation of global NETs in response to anthropogenic 2 
increases in carbon emissions accuses its implementers of excessive arrogance or self-3 
confidence. 4 
 5 
There is a less sensible and a more sensible version of this worry. The less sensible 6 
version says that in intentionally manipulating the climate at the scale proposed for 7 
some NETs, we would be 'playing God'; it is not our place to intervene on the climate at 8 
that scale. A fallacy lurks here: the idea that there is some 'natural' state of the world and 9 
humans' place in it that ought to be protected against change. Whatever is 'not natural' is 10 
somehow also bad, with the corollary that whatever is natural is somehow also good. 11 
This is demonstrably false: nature contains plenty of terror (natural disasters, violent 12 
killing, starvation and suffering) and there are artificial goods (like medical advances, or 13 
the internet). This is not to mention that the distinction between 'natural' and 'non-14 
natural' is itself difficult to draw in a compelling way. This same objection has been 15 
waged against abortions, stem cell research, the genetic modification of food, cloning, 16 
and so on. There is little to recommend it. 17 
 18 
The more sensible version of the objection suggests that there are better and worse ways 19 
in which humans might relate to the environment—and that standing in a relation of 20 
domination over it is especially problematic. Certain interventions upon the climate 21 
system do seem to put humans into a dominating relationship with nature. For example, 22 
in implementing NETs instead of choosing to make radical cuts to our consumption 23 
practices, we move away from an appropriate balance between humans and the natural 24 
environment (Confucians emphasize the importance of this kind of balance37). Here 25 
'playing God' is better understood as exercising inappropriate levels of control over the 26 
natural world.  27 
 28 
Conclusion 29 
The complexity of the technologies, systems, and measures involved in combating 30 
anthropogenic climate change raise difficult scientific and engineering challenges, but 31 
there are significant ethical dimensions as well. In the case of enhanced weathering, in 32 
comparison to other geoengineering measures, there is at least the possibility of a 33 
reduced cost, reduced impact way of decreasing atmospheric carbon, with positive 34 
knock-on effects such as decreased oceanic acidity. However, uncertainty about these 35 
factors make relying on such possibilities difficult. Moreover, the ethical considerations 36 
are not exhausted by uncertainty: issues of responsibility and governance are pressing, 37 
and if enhanced weathering presents a moral hazard, it is not obvious whether we 38 
should attempt to resolve that uncertainty in the first place. Ethical considerations 39 
further highlight the distinction between less ambitious NETs, best seen as supplements 40 
to traditional GHG emissions reduction, and more ambitious, extensive approaches. The 1 
former are less effective alone, but present less moral risk. The latter require 2 
significantly more caution. Our aim has not been to resolve such issues, but to argue 3 
that ethical concerns have a place alongside empirical, political and social factors as we 4 
consider how to best respond to the critical challenge that anthropogenic climate change 5 
poses. 6 
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